A Spin with Spinoza

Hey, everyone!

I was looking over my old work on refuting Spinoza from a few years back, and decided that a stronger case could be presented for the circular nature of his argument for monism/pantheism in The Ethics.

Here’s what I’ve come up with this time: an outline providing his own justifications of his propositions, and my using of his own metaphysical system and writing to back up his premises, which as I hope I’ve shown beg the conclusions.

Keeping an eye on the text in brackets will be key to following the circularity here. I apologize in advance for any lapses in logic—this was drawn up from conception to publication in less than two hours.

Feedback and critique would be great:

  1. A substance is [Definition III] “that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself: in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception.”
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  2. An Attribute is [Definition IV] “that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance.”
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  3. Therefore, a substance is defined by its attributes.
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  4. But, only two (2) attributes exist—extension and thought [Des. Meditations]—which interact.
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  5. But, [Proposition III] “things which have nothing in common cannot be one the cause of the other.”
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    ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍5a. “If they have nothing in common, it follows that one cannot be apprehended by means of the other…”
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    ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍5ai. [Axiom V] Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, the one by means of the other; the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other."
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    ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍5b. [Axiom IV] “The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the knowledge of a cause.”
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    ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍5bi. To have complete knowledge of an effect is to comprehend its essence.
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    ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍5bii. An Attribute is [Definition IV] “that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance.”
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    ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍5biii. Only two (2) attributes exist—extension and thought.
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    ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍5biv. [Proposition III] “Things which have nothing in common cannot be one the cause of the other.”
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  6. Therefore, thought and extension must inhere in the same substance.
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    ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍6a. If this were not so, the substance defined by the attribute of thought could not interact with the substance defined by the attribute of extension, because they would have nothing in common and therefore could have no causal relations.
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  7. Therefore, there is only one substance.
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    ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍7a. A substance is defined by its attributes [∵(1∧2)].
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    ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍7b. Only two (2) attributes exist—extension and thought—which inhere in the same substance [∵(4∧5)].
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  8. Therefore, there is only one substance. ≡ [Proposition XIV] “Besides God no substance can be granted or conceived.”
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    ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍8a. [Definition VI] “By God, I mean a being absolutely infinite-that is, a substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality… I say absolutely infinite, not infinite after its kind: for, of a thing infinite only after its kind, infinite attributes may be denied; but that which is absolutely infinite, contains in its essence whatever expresses reality, and involves no negation.”
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    ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍8b. There are only two attributes which express reality—extension and thought.
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    ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍8c. These attributes inhere in the same substance [∵(4∧5)].
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    ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍8d. Therefore, this substance “contains in its essence whatever expresses reality…”
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    ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍8e. Therefore, this substance is God.
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    ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍8f. There is only one substance, in which extension and thought inhere [∵((1∧2)∧(4∧5))].
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  9. [Proposition XIV] “Besides God no substance can be granted or conceived.” ≡ [Proposition VI] “one substance cannot be produced by another substance.”
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    ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍9a. If besides the one substance, God, no substance can be granted or conceived, then another substance cannot be produced by that one substance, thereby granting or conceiving it.
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  10. [Proposition VI] “one substance cannot be produced by another substance.” ≡ [Proposition III] “Things which have nothing in common cannot be one the cause of the other.”
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    ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍10a. [Axiom IV] “The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the knowledge of a cause.”
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    ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍10ai. To have complete knowledge of an effect is to comprehend its essence.
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    ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍10aii. An Attribute is [Definition IV] “that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance.”
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    ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍10aiii. Only two (2) attributes exist—extension and thought.
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    ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍ ‍‍‍‍‍‍ ‍‍10aiv. [Proposition III] “Things which have nothing in common cannot be one the cause of the other.”

The contested conclusions need to be invoked in order to defend the contested premises on which they rest, and therefore the argument is circular.

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This is a spin, isn’t it? I’m dizzy with reading it!

There are several things lacking in Spinoza’s argument, as well. It seems he’s saying that there can only be one substance, and two attributes. But two substances are needed in order for there to be cause and effect. He spends a good deal of time thinking about cause and effect, when by his own reasoning, cause and effect do not exist. So he’s shoot himself in the foot already.

Other than that, I would like to see a more cohesive form of Spinoza’s argument. It seems awfully disjointed the way you presented it here. Maybe condense it into a good syllogism or two?

Believe it or not, this version is very condensed haha It’s only the portions of his argument that are generally contested that I gave and defended using other portions.

To really boil it down in the simplest manner, Spinoza is essentially arguing to solve the mind-matter problem of Descartes’ metaphysics, to which Spinoza as a basis adheres.

Now, Descartes is at a loss as to how mind (the substance of thought, as he puts it) can interact with matter (the substance of extension, as he puts it) (i.e. cause changes in it), and vice versa.

So, Spinoza supposes that “[t]he knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the knowledge of a cause.” And to have knowledge of anything, is to know it has either extension or thought (the only two true attributes, he and Descartes suppose). Therefore, if a substance with thought seems to have caused a substance with extension or something in a substance with extension (or vice versa), and to have knowledge of that effect requires knowledge of the cause, as well as that “if [substances] have nothing in common, it follows that one cannot be apprehended by means of the other…,” the substance with thought then must also have extension, and the substance of extension must also have mind. If this were not so, we could not have knowledge of one from the other. They are then therefore one substance, and not two substances (because the only two defining attributes a substance can have, under their view, is thought and extension, attributes which they both must have for there to be interaction at all, in their view).

Thus, because there are only two attributes, which must inhere in the same substance, there is only one substance that exists or can exist.

The outline in the OP is more muddled because I pieced together defenses of Spinoza’s suppositions based on his writings and quotations from them, which Spinoza himself provided no direct and explicit defense for—because, as I hoped to show, if he had, it would reveal that they could only be defended by presupposing his conclusions drawn from them. In other words, because his underlying assumptions are so muddled together with his conclusions, his argument is ridiculously muddled when you try to defend those conclusions.

The original can be found here:
http://www.sacred-texts.com/phi/spinoza/ethics/eth01.htm

he was half jew, first off, and as Francis Parker Yockey said “liberalism is rationalism in politics” that’s basically my stance.